For years, Europe’s energy dilemma has been: which sources of oil and gas can it risk becoming dependant on? Who Europe buys from, where the balance of geopolitical power lies, and how quickly European nations could diversify supply if they needed to, have all been historically important. Recent events have shown that it remains a pressing concern to assess how exposed our energy systems are to disruption, whether accidental, climate-related, or deliberate.
Take natural gas: at the time of writing, Europe has found itself importing LNG from Australia – about as far as it is possible to ship gas – after severe cold weather hit key US facilities. An Arctic blast in January froze infrastructure, causing exports to dip, and traders were forced into a scramble for supply. It wasn’t geopolitics that caused the problem in this instance, it was weather, and yet the outcome looked the same: supply and price shocks, and a reminder that resilience matters just as much as origin.
Of course, energy infrastructure remains firmly at the mercy of geopolitical whims. Russia’s recent strike near the Brody oil hub in western Ukraine hit close to the Druzhba pipeline. Built in the 1960s, the fabled ‘friendship pipeline’ supplies crude to Hungary, and its fate shows us that pipelines were never really benevolent, or even neutral, assets. They are strategic pressure points, and their status become symbolic as global tensions ramp up. This symbolism was evident in the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines in 2022. Whether or not Russia was responsible, the enduring question is why destroying your own multi-billion-dollar assets might make a morsel of strategic sense. The uncomfortable answer is that it can make sense, because infrastructure attacks change political leverage, test red lines, and expose how quickly markets and governments can be rattled.
The EU’s decision to endorse a full ban on Russian pipeline gas and LNG imports by late 2027 shows the commitment of the member states to fully severing ties with the nation that they once depended on for 40% of their gas.
Under the agreement, the EU will stop all Russian LNG imports by the end of 2026, and bring in a total ban on pipelined Russian gas by 30 September 2027. A further month’s contingency is built in to the pipeline ban, in case some countries need a final shot of the Russian good stuff to fill storage sites ahead of the winter.
Energy security is increasingly about how robust and protected the delivery system is. Climate extremes, conflict, sabotage, and political signalling are now all part of the same risk landscape. Policymakers and oil and gas operators must build assets that can withstand shocks from every direction. Turn to p.10 for Spencer Fane LLP’s article on the digital threats facing pipelines: author Shawn Tuma admits it’s not a feel-good message that he brings, but it’s an important one. At p.19, Yokogawa discusses modern pipeline operations and suggests that “safety without security is like mopping the floor while the roof is still leaking”. And a trio of articles on pipeline equipment (beginning at p.42) highlight how high standards for pipe moving, land clearing, and pipe lifting are the foundation of safety, and how they directly shape risk outcomes further down the line.
